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“Before it was better…the government looked after you, gave you money. Now, maybe you have 
more freedom but you have to do everything yourself. You have to look after yourself. There is 
no more social safety net…”  
 
-- Middle-aged male villager from 
Sideng Village, Shaxi Township  
 
In his analysis of post-Mao China, historian Maurice Meisner writes, “it was the 
countryside where the majority of the Chinese people live and work, that was first to feel 
fully both the economic dynamism and the social destructiveness of a market economy” 
(Meisner 460). Meisner’s statement underscores how the commercialization of the rural 
economy changed rural society.  Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to power in 1978 marked a 
re-articulation of state orthodoxy that prioritized economic development. The era of 
‘reform’ was launched in the countryside with the break up of the communes and the 
introduction of the household responsibility system. What are the consequences of 
utopian marketization on rural society? Why do rural laborers harbor such deep hostility 
toward the restructuring of rural society? Below, I engage these questions by placing my 
discussion in the time-space of an ethnically Bai village in Yunnan province. With data 
collected through interviewing local residents and government officials, living with a 
local family, and surveying the local population, I have a relatively thorough 
understanding of the costs of Sideng’s restructuring process. The problems of Sideng’s 
restructuring are in certain ways representative of nationwide patterns so I hope that this 
paper will reveal problems that are universal to the marketization of China’s rural 
communities. The marketization of village of Sideng has led to the attenuation of social 
relationships, the transformation of values, and the emergence of a new kind of 
existential uncertainty.  
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I. Economic and Social Reform  
 
The gathering strength of neoliberal policies in the 1980s opened up the world to 
transformative market and financial forces. In so doing, the neoliberal doctrine created a 
space for China’s entry and incorporation into the global market. Chinese advocates of 
market-type reform argued that the nation’s economic growth and material well being 
would best be served if production and distribution of goods were determined by 
‘unfettered’ market forces. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform program began in 1979, 
officially sanctioned by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee’s injunction 
of ‘adjustment by the market’ (Meisner 453). That a market economy inevitably breeds 
capitalist social relationships, and all the inequitable consequences of capitalism, was 
well known to China’s Communist leaders in the late 1970s (Riskin 318). Deng Xiaoping 
and his reformist associates, however, tended to disseminate a naïve view of the wonders 
of the market (Riskin 318). 1 The state apparatus saw economic decentralization and the 
introduction of market mechanisms as a means to develop ‘modern’ productive forces. 
The state’s function was then transformed from guaranteeing social services to 
guaranteeing, by force if necessary, the proper functioning of markets.  
The social reforms of 1978-89 can be divided into two major phases: the 1978-84 
rural reform phase and the urban reform phase from 1984 onward. The rural reforms 
implemented in the 1980s sought to structurally transform rural areas first by ‘liberating’ 
                                                 
1
 According to Karl Polanyi, the market has always existed throughout the history of 
mankind, but it is rare to see a market economy. Until the nineteenth century, the 
economy had always been embedded in society – economic activities were subordinated 
to political, religious, and social relations. Classical economists of the nineteenth century, 
however, attempted to create a disembedded market that subordinated society to the 
market.  
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people’s communes through the state-sponsored redistribution of land and the 
implementation of the household responsibility system; and, second, working through 
state/policy coordination to raise the prices of rural products, encourage consumption in 
rural areas, and develop rural industry (H. Wang 12). The policy of forced self-
sufficiency in grain was replaced by one encouraging diversification and specialization. 
China’s reforms that began in agriculture with the movement from the commune system 
of production to the individual responsibility system – in effect partial privatization – 
created the institutional infrastructure for a market economy.  
The household responsibility system resurrected the incentive principle and the 
entrepreneurial spirit as it portioned what were public resources in partial privatization 
schemes.  The system returned the cultivation and management of farmland to individual 
peasant households in what can be called ‘privatization without ownership’ (H. Lee 521). 
Under the ‘responsibility’ system, individual peasant households concluded contractual 
agreements for farmlands with the local state authority, or the production team, to 
cultivate a portion of communal land as if it were their own for a period of fifteen years 
(Lee 41). Farm tools and animals, previously collectively held by the production team, 
were divided among the households. In agreeing to take on ‘individual responsibility’, the 
households paid the team contractually stipulated portions of their output to meet state 
tax and grain quota obligations (Meisner 461). Prices paid to peasants for agricultural 
products were increased – any surplus above the quota became the property of the 
household, not the commune (Meisner 454). Surplus could thus be consumed or sold in 
private markets for profit.  
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Initially, these reform measures brought dramatic improvements in production. 
Agricultural gross output value rose by no less than nine percent per year between 1978 
and 1984, with the growth rates of sideline production and animal husbandry reaching 
18.6 percent and 9.4 percent respectively (Lee 41). The economic upsurge in the 
countryside was partly attributable to the incentives provided by the household 
responsibility system, but also the result of the adjustment of agricultural products 
prices2(H. Wang 12). The rural reform policy that raised prices protected local communal 
markets. Unfortunately, however, the state, emboldened by the increase in surplus capital 
from the countryside, pursued urban reforms to promote the capitalist restructuring of 
urban industry. With the implementation of urban reforms, grain shortages increased 
along with wild fluctuations in agricultural prices. From 1985 to 1989, peasant incomes 
began to fall (H. Wang 18). The post-1984 urban reforms widened the urban-rural divide. 
If collectivization dissolved the economic foundations of the rich peasant class, 
de-collectivization reintroduced class divisions. The decollectivization of agriculture 
created new class divisions between rich peasants with specialized household 
designations and impoverished peasants who, unable to maintain their plots, were, and 
still are, forced to sell the mortgages of their leaseholds, thereby becoming wage laborers. 
The household responsibility also revealed that nearly half the rural labor force was 
redundant. By the mid 1980s some 30 to 40 percent of China’s rural labor force –between 
114 and 152 million peasants – was surplus to the requirements of agricultural production 
(Lee 42). The commune system whereby labor was compensated for even marginal 
contributions to output obscured the massive redundancy of rural laborers. Prior to 1979, 
                                                 
2
 In 1979, the state increased prices for agricultural products.  
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the Chinese government absorbed rural labor by increasing the labor intensity of crop 
production, favoring a labor-intensive crop mix. Post 1979, the Chinese state reduced its 
intervention in labor markets. Some of the surplus labor found alternative opportunities in 
rural nonagricultural employment, but the majority resorted to rural urban migration to 
escape rural unemployment and poverty (Lee 42). De-collectivization of agriculture then 
induced peasants to work as temporary migrant workers in urban centers.  
The state’s decentralization of the rural economy loosened social controls on 
mobility whereby laborers could migrate to urban centers to work. The rural-urban influx 
of labor into China’s towns and cities provided the cheap labor necessary for the new 
manufacturing establishments and infrastructure projects that were the expressions of the 
state’s post-1984 reorganization of urban industry. The new class of temporary migrant 
laborers is transient residents in China’s urban centers. Without the urban household 
registration card (hukou), migrant laborers only enjoy social rights in the impoverished 
villages from which they fled. Peasants then leave their farms, but not their villages. In 
other words, peasants are bound to the rural areas from which they migrated where they 
enjoy the social security that a plot of land provides. The state has thus created a 
segmented labor market: urbanites work as permanent workers in the state sector or in 
other high paying primary labor markets, while rural temporary migrants can only get 
jobs in the secondary labor market in the private sectors that are low paying (So 109). 
Because of the lack of labor security peasant laborers must periodically migrate back and 
forth between urban and rural areas in accordance with urban economic declines (H. 
Wang 29).  
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The dismantlement of the commune system transformed rural China. The uneven 
expansion of the market has rendered peasants and land semi-free commodities, 
undermining both the organization of rural village society as well as the ability of rural 
society to rehabilitate itself. Under the planned economy, communes and brigades in rural 
areas were both economic, and social and political institutions. They provided not only 
job opportunities and salaries (or work points) to their members, but also social welfare 
services3 to them and their family members. After the government launched its economic 
reform, however, policy makers abandoned the search for basic welfare and equality, and 
focused on development, exclusively pursuing economic growth. The primary test for 
success is no longer the well being of workers in an allegedly workers’ state, but 
productivity. Because rural communities have been deprived of social functions and 
turned into purely economic institutions, farmers are forced to get by with reduced 
entitlement to assistance and security. Consequently, the welfare of individuals now 
depends almost entirely on the cash nexus.  
 
II. Sideng Village, Shaxi Township 
 
Sideng is a peaceful village with a long history. Due to its location – in an interior 
region at a high altitude -- the village has remained relatively underdeveloped. Slow 
economic growth, however, has meant that much of the village’s cultural heritage has 
been preserved. Upon entering the village, one is greeted by cobblestone streets, 
traditional Bai architecture, and historic sites such as the Sideng market. Once a station 
                                                 
3
 Social welfare services are defined as daycare, kindergarten, school, medical care, 
assistance, old-age insurance, burial and funeral services.  
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on the Tea-Horse Caravan trail, the World Monument Fund has classified Sideng as a 
world heritage site. Villagers have then been able to use both the their history and their 
Bai ethnicity as leverage in the market economy. Undeniably, Sideng’s present prosperity 
and success has been built on the foundations of tourism.  
As Sideng has become increasingly integrated into the market economy, the 
village has become more vulnerable to crisis. Against the background of Sideng’s 
tranquility and prosperity, the phenomena of unemployment and socioeconomic 
polarization have become increasingly apparent on a daily basis, and restructuring itself 
has led directly to farmers’ profound sense of discontent.  While tourism certainly helps 
to cushion the uncertainty of a market economy, the village remains economically 
impoverished. The average yearly income is approximately US $120 (Feiner , etal. 3). 
Agriculture remains the primary source of income for the majority of economically active 
residents. But, as Shaxi Township is located at about 2,3000 meters above sea level – the 
highest altitude where wet rice can still be cultivated – only one harvest is possible 
annually. Construction work accounts for two-thirds of the secondary industrial sector; 
stone and woodcarving, and architectural building craftsmanship are strong traditional 
businesses. Skilled carpenters, and wood and stone carvers are often contracted for 
construction projects across the province as well as in many parts of the country. Male 
rural laborersconstantly move between urban centers and the village to help supplement 
their families’ income.  
Still, Sideng is economically better off than other Bai villages in the valley. The 
village across the river, where my host father’s family is originally from, is visibly 
poorer. The village has dirt roads, run-down houses, and mounds of trash. My host’s 
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childhood house is sparsely furnished with dirt floors. The house is overcrowded with 
over three generations living in one small space. While my sisters rarely helped in the 
fields, the children from my host’s hometown all labor in the fields. Whenever I would 
visit my host’s family, I would pass several school-aged children on their way to labor in 
the fields. My host said he thought the majority of youth, particularly males, left his 
village to find work in the cities and thereby improve their lives.  
The neighboring Han village, on the other hand, is more economically prosperous 
than both Sideng and my host’s hometown. A Han villager explained that Han farmers 
monopolize the farming market in the valley, producing all food products that are 
consumed in the valley. He suggested that villagers could make more money farming 
cash crops than if they migrated to urban centers. He claimed that his village’s land was 
more fertile and thus more conducive to certain high yield cash crops. Han villagers also 
have a greater square foot of land per person meaning that families can produce more 
than in other villages where the distribution of land is not as favorable. When asked if 
this disparity in access to land reflected an inequality between Bai and Han, he said that 
the Han villagers’ quality and quantity of land was simply a historical fact; thus, 
disguising a political problem as a historical one rendering the problem insoluble. Six 
Han workers who were fixing the road in Sideng agreed with their fellow villager’s 
comments. They insisted that they would not leave their village to labor as migrant 
laborers. But what work opportunities are there in the valley? They all laughed. “Only 
farming, but we have many agricultural products,” one worker said.  
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III. Attenuation of Social Relationships  
   
The economic reforms transformed cooperative and community social relations. 
Community social relations once transcended the interests of individual household 
productive units and their mediation by the market. In Sideng, although economic 
relations are still subject to kinship relations, the interests of the individual are privileged 
over all else. Friendships, and even familial relationships, have been commodified; for 
example, families now have to pay family members and friends to help transplant rice 
seedlings into rice paddies. The quality of people’s lives is dependent upon the market 
that serves only those who can afford to pay. It is not that they do not want to help my 
hostess told me, but that persons can no longer afford to labor for free. The value of 
friendship is overwhelmed by the individual libertarianism that the market economy 
requires. The market unraveled the moral linkage between individuals and various social 
groups. 
The spread of the market economy gave rise to a new rural social structure that 
juxtaposes a bourgeois elite of de fact owners of various commercial enterprises to a 
peasantry engaged in family farming and a growing underclass of wage and migrant 
laborers. The fast transition to a market society broke the traditional social safety net to 
create social differentiation. There is a distinct social hierarchy in Sideng organized 
around material wealth. The guesthouse owners – all outside entrepreneurs – act as an 
elite while those who have very little land occupy the social space of the marginalized. 
Even among the peasant ‘class’, income differentials created class divisions. Some 
peasants own small businesses while others only had their plots of land to depend on. My 
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father often said that those who only have 1 mu of land4 have to migrate from Sideng in 
order to survive. Another local who would regularly migrate to find work said, “we are 
peasants, there is no money here…we have to migrate.” As a set of political 
arrangements, the formation of a market society deepened and legitimized social 
polarization.  
Migration reconfigured the nuclear family. My host spoke of how migration 
strained family relationships. He himself was once a migrant construction worker, 
working to save money to marry and build a house. He only worked as a construction 
worker for three years before returning home. 
“It was too hard being so far from my family. Then when I got married 
and had kids I could not imagine leaving home. When you leave home 
you have no idea what is happening at home…if there is a problem you 
do not know. Today it is somewhat easier to leave. Everyone has cell 
phones so you can just call home, but before you would write letters that 
would take such a long time to reach home. You suffer away from your 
family. You miss them.”  
 
Migration loosens family ties thereby changing the family structure. The gendered 
division of rural labor means that women rarely migrate; men say it is the woman’s 
responsibility to raise the children and farm the fields.5  Instead, like my host, most 
working-age men will migrate from Sideng to work as construction workers. These 
migrant workers are temporary; they migrate home between jobs and to help during the 
harvesting season. My host’s neighbor, who returned home to help with the harvest, said 
he always missed his family. When I asked him why he left so often he looked at his two 
daughters – six and twelve – and said, “I have to provide for my kids, send them to 
school, pay for life’s basic necessities.” His sojourn at home was bittersweet; he was 
                                                 
4
 One mu is approximately the equivalent of a hectare.  
5
 One informant suggested that men’s lives were more difficult that women’s as they 
were forced to migrate to supplement the family’s income. 
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anxious about returning to Kunming to find work. I had to wonder whether his absence 
contributed to the improvement of his daughters’ lives or harmed their healthy 
development. He looked after his daughters’ material needs, but neglected their 
emotional ones. 
 The family is shaped by capitalist practices that require rural bodies to enter a 
particular set of production relations where they experience the process of alienation.   
The family suffers from the absence of the father. One father who had been migrating 
back and forth for over twenty years said he rarely returns home.  
“I go to the city to make money. I cannot go home yet, I still want to 
make money. My wife is a good wife. She does everything by herself, 
but she is used to it. She does not like the city. She has her friends at 
home. She is always busy laboring in the fields. She does not really need 
me at home. I call every night. If I do not call my daughter will call me 
and ask me why I didn’t call. If there is a problem at home I will go 
home. Now, my wife is sick…nothing serous, but I will go home and 
take her to see a doctor.”  
 
His wife often complained about not having enough money for life’s basic necessities. I 
wondered how often he actually sent money home. When I visited him in Kunming, he 
seemed to have established a separate life for himself. His prolonged absence was 
inscribed in the family structure – the wife took on both the role of father and mother. 
The family today is subsumed by the expropriation of global capitalism and the state 
socialist system, which is continuously in favor of urban and industrial development.  
 
IV. Transformation of Values  
  
The emphasis on accumulating wealth means that villagers pursue their maximum 
interests in the market at the expense of preserving traditional values. Whereas before 
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kinship relations were most valued, toady families are increasingly divided over issues 
related to money; for example, families will feud over the deeds to family homes. 
Increasingly the meaning of prosperity has changed to focus solely on economic profit.  
Visiting a woodcarving workshop, I was struck by how obsessed the young apprentices 
were by money. Their conversations centered on discussions of material wealth. They did 
not know – and most likely were not even interested in – the historical and cultural 
significance of woodcarving; rather, they were more concerned with the commercial 
value of their craft.  Education was deemed unimportant; all the apprentices had barely 
finished middle school. Instead, they wanted instant gratification. They wanted to acquire 
a skill from which they knew they could quickly benefit financially. These youth are 
caught in the contradiction of modernity– engrossed by fantasies of wealth but trapped by 
the limitations of their environment.  
The network of relationships between migrants, cities, and their place of origin 
enables a continuous crisscrossing between the traditional local sphere and the new forms 
of life in the big cities. With relatives working in the cities, the apprentices were very 
aware of urban fashions. They would flaunt their cell phones; blast loud mainstream 
Chinese techno; and, wear the latest urban clothes.  Their behavior carried the deceptive 
sheen of modernity. People who move to an environment, which is different from their 
traditional environment, may lose aspects of their culture in favor of the prevailing 
culture of the destination area through the process of acculturation or intermarriage 
(Bilik, etal. 14). With the out-migration of family members to urban areas, the socio-
cultural environment of Sideng was altered.  My hostess’s younger sister embodies this 
process of acculturation. Migrating to the city after she finished middle school, she 
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married a fellow migrant worker from Sichuan. As a result, she no longer practices Bai 
customs and her three-year-old daughter cannot even speak the Bai language.  
On the other hand, temporary migrants’ ethnic identity was strengthened from 
their being removed from their community. Construction workers spoke of the beauty of 
their village. These workers migrate in together and are largely isolated from the urban 
society of their destination area. Having spent time in cities, they appreciated the pristine 
environment of their village. When I asked these workers if they ever felt discriminated 
against in the city, they all responded that they themselves looked down upon city 
citizens. One migrant elaborated,  
“Our lives are better than city peoples. In the city if you are poor you 
have nothing, but in the country you have land. In the city, the air and 
water are polluted. There are too many people. There are factories. In the 
countryside, our water is drinkable, our air clean. We have land, nice 
houses. Our food is better too. The city is really horrible.” 
 
His response reflected an appreciation of his local environment, one that is not as of yet 
completely degraded by economic development. Still, many hope that Sideng will 
develop local industry so they no longer to migrate to find work opportunities. Villagers 
believe that the development of modern productive forces will bring them progress and 
thus happiness.. Progress is now associated with Deng Xiaoping’s slogan, “to get rich is 
glorious.”  
Personal desire is upheld by opportune theories of individualism, spurning 
traditional society. One migrant told me that as a migrant he could make 300 RMB per 
day. When I asked my host if this was true, he became outraged.  
“You can barely make 100 RMB selling pork let alone building a house 
in the city. The most you might make in one day is 80 RMB, but then 
again you have to buy your own food, cigarettes, and alcohol. If you 
could make 300 RMB a day there would be no one left in the village. I 
 16
would have left long ago if I could make 300 RMB a day building 
houses.”  
 
My hostess added, “Just look at their house. If he made that much money, their house 
would be a palace.” Her comment speaks to the callousness of this materialistic time.  
That my host thought everyone would leave if they could make 300 RMB a day as a 
construction worker shows how capital accumulation dictates people’s lives. No matter 
how abysmal life is as a migrant worker, persons continue to migrate to increase their 
purchasing power. Sitting in the living room of a migrant worker who eventually was 
able to start his own construction company, I realized how strong the desire to 
accumulate wealth is. The room was furnished with a large flat screen television and 
several velvet couches. He had succeeded in realizing every villager’s dream. He had 
secured enough wealth to ensure his family lived a ‘lavish’ lifestyle.  
 Rural society, and its values, is reorganized to facilitate capital accumulation. The 
owner of the construction company repeated that he needed to make money.  
“There is no money at home. I will not stop migrating until I stop 
wanting to make money. Today, you have money you can do anything, 
you can go anywhere. With money life is comfortable, there are no 
problems. Now you just need money, right? Money is power.”  
 
 I asked him if he thought the economic reforms of the 1980s helped to improve villagers’ 
lives. He responded,  
“After reforms life got better, farmers had more freedom to grow what 
they wanted. They had the freedom to leave and work in the cities to 
make more money.”  
 
He thus defined ‘freedom’ as the ability to accumulate economic wealth, the ability to 
consume. Though he admitted that rural society lacked a social safety net, for him the 
possibility of accumulating enormous amounts of wealth is more important.  
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But, such is the discursive hegemony of neoliberalism in China. As an ideology that 
underpins the logic of class formation it requires the construction of a market-based 
populist culture that promotes differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism; 
it requires the construction of popular consent. The ideology’s penetration into ‘common 
sense’ understandings makes it increasingly difficult to undermine its discursive 
hegemony.  
 
V. The Emergence of a New Kind of Existential Uncertainty 
 
When market forces turned society into a market society, people who had 
previously depended on the collective and family were forced to start living on their own 
income. Though great social wealth was created6, the market is full of risks; everyone is 
vulnerable to misfortune. It is then difficult for individuals – especially those who live in 
a substrate of society – to take care of themselves. My host would always say,  
“Life is uncertain…nothing is certain anymore. Farming is uncertain, just 
like migrating to work, just like doing business is uncertain. Nothing is 
certain anymore.”  
 
As we labored in the fields my father stressed that as a farmer you cannot afford to be 
sick. “Who will take care of your fields? Who will help you?” he asked. After the new 
household farming system increased agricultural production, the state largely divested 
itself of rural public works and social welfare: collectively owned irrigation, public 
                                                 
6
 With the implementation of economic reforms, Chinese people who had suffered from a 
shortage of material goods quickly experienced a period of surplus. 
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medical care, and schooling fell into disrepair, and often the local government took on a 
predatory relationship to the rural population.7 
As a family of subsistence farmers, my hosts’ livelihoods were dependent upon a 
successful crop yield. One day we went to check the rice seedlings that were soon to be 
transplanted in the rice paddies. The rice seedlings were completely dried out. Both of my 
hosts were devastated, aware of how much the family’s finances would suffer with a 
failed crop. To salvage what they could of the crop, they stayed throughout the night, 
soaking the rice seedlings in water. My host also lamented over the poor quality of this 
year’s barley yield.  “These stalks are too short,” he said as we were harvesting the 
barely. “But it does not matter…we will feed this stuff to the pigs,” he added, shaking his 
head. My hostess explained how this year the excess supply of barley meant that the 
demand for barely had decreased. The market, it seems, has grown too strong for 
individual households to operate within it. Many farming families no longer make a profit 
from farming. Some families do not even earn enough selling agricultural products to 
support themselves. China’s small family farms have no chance of operating efficiently 
within the national and international market system, but rural households rely on those 
markets for agricultural inputs and sales. Exploitation is then understood as the result of 
unfair competition between weak peasant producers and big capital. As such, the farmer’s 
life is fraught with uncertainty so he migrates to try to remedy that uncertainty.  
                                                 
7
 Even after the period of heavy ‘primitive accumulation’, the rural government often 
used high taxation and fees as a form of rent seeking. This predatory relationship, most 
extreme during the 1990s, is clearly described in Li Changping’s ‘The Crisis in the 
Countryside’, in One China, Many Paths, ed. Chaohua Wang (London: Verso, 2003). 
198-218.  
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With few opportunities to supplement their farming income in the village, many 
male rural laborers migrate to cities. Out of twenty-three persons I surveyed, sixteen had, 
at some point in their lives, migrated from Sideng to make money in the urban centers. 
Migrant workers, however, make very little considering the work they do; for example, 
construction workers only make 80 RMB a day and are expected to buy their own food, 
cigarettes, and alcohol. Their employers, however, provide housing. Such housing is 
often substandard with no running water and electricity – ten to fifteen people will share 
a room. As these temporary settlements are located next to the construction site, 
management is able to enforce a just-in-time labor system where the dormitory is an 
extension of the work site. The spatial proximity of workers’ dormitories to the 
construction site means that management can call on workers to work longer hours, and 
continue to discipline workers even when they are not at the construction site.  Worker 
accommodation does not function to create a long-term protracted relationship between 
the production machine and the individual worker.  The utilization of dormitory labor in 
Chinese urban areas allows enterprises to maximize working time and extract labor 
power without worrying about the reproduction of labor in the long run. Worker 
accommodation then creates a hybrid, transient workforce that circulates between 
worksites and the countryside.  
 The emergence of a legal system has, according to migrant workers I interviewed, 
lessened the uncertainties that plague migrant life. “Today,” my host said,  
“the boss has to give you money. If he delays you can report him to the 
government and he will be fined. Before, bosses would not pay you, 
making up excuses about why they were delaying. You did not know if 
you could even get your money. Now, no problem. The government 
document ensures you your wages.” 
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When I asked another migrant worker, if management sometimes undercut workers’ 
wages he responded that such a situation is not possible. If management were to try and 
undermine workers, workers would mobilize around the law and demand state 
intervention. A boss elaborated, “We would never try to steal our workers’ wages…If we 
did we would face exorbitant fines.” There is, however, a tension between accumulation 
and legitimization; the imperative to rely on local accumulation to fuel ‘marketization’ 
clashes with the imperative to maintain legitimacy by providing justice to the most 
disadvantaged. Furthermore, the state’s legalistic language that upholds the legality of the 
transformation of China’s national economy proletarianizes workers who no longer own 
the means of production. Legal language dissolves forms of collective ownership that 
previously ensured villagers a degree of social security. The legalistic language of the 
state forces migrant workers to act as individual citizens as opposed to the collective class 
of peasants they once were.  
 
VI. De-Commercialization  
 
To reduce social disparity, the Chinese government is making a concerted effort 
to re-embed the economy within social relations through ‘de-commercialization.’ Under 
the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the state refocused its attention on rural 
issues after decades of neglect. The state began by looking for ways to increase rural 
incomes; for example, in 2006, agricultural taxes were abolished and comprehensive 
rural subsidies introduced. By late 2005, the state called for a major new program to 
‘build a socialist new countryside’ (jianshe shehuizhuyi xin nongcun). Under the 
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formulation ‘building a socialist new countryside’, the party proposed that ‘industry help 
agriculture’ (gongye fanbu nongye).8 The state is now investing heavily in rural education 
and infrastructure development; for example, compulsory primary and middle school 
education in rural areas is free.  
This major policy initiative should be seen as a response to a complex series of 
factors. On the one hand, the state is responding to rural unrest that can potentially 
damage the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s power. On the other hand, the new party 
leadership is moving away from the economic policies of the previous regime that relied 
so heavily on the export economy and infrastructure investment. Rural development is 
vital for building internal consumer demand, which cannot be sustained by the urban 
middle class alone.  
The local government in Sideng, however, is withdrawing itself from the public 
sector instead of re-investing in it. Talking with a government official in Sideng I did not 
get the impression that the local government was trying to de-commodify rural society. 
The emphasis throughout the conversation was on individual responsibility. As the 
official said, “People have to do things themselves.” The local state authority will 
sometimes help the very poor, but who qualify as ‘very poor’ remains unclear. Instead of 
giving villagers’ “handouts”, the local government is helping individuals navigate the 
market. To improve agricultural industry, the government is pushing individual farmers 
to grow cash crops like tobacco. The local official said, “If they grow cash crops, their 
lives will improve considerably…they will make more money.” The government dictates 
who can and cannot grow cash crops, and how much of the person’s land can be devoted 
                                                 
8
 Fanbu implies that agriculture has nourished industry so that now industry must nourish 
agriculture.  
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to the growth of cash crops. But, who is selected for the lucrative cash crop business is 
unclear; is it those persons who have a good relationship with the local government? If 
so, is this policy exacerbating inequalities instead of ameliorating them?  
The local government does very little in Sideng to promote diverse local 
employment opportunities. The local government is trying to develop tourism, the official 
said, but then added that even tourism will not be a huge employment opportunity. The 
local official said,  
“Improving the peasants’ lives is a slow process. We don’t give individual 
families money per say, but we have been spending money on 
infrastructure like roads, bridges and schools that indirectly benefits them. 
But all of this investment of course does not mean a decrease in migration. 
We are focusing on developing agricultural industry with the introduction 
of cash crops that will bring individual families more money and thus 
improve their lives and the village infrastructure.”  
 
For the local official, the out-migration of a large percentage of the local population is not 
a negative development. Migrants’ remittances fuel local economic development. The 
local government will sometimes even help persons migrate to coastal areas. Such 
endeavors further commercialize the rural economy and render peasants commodities. 
The village then is becoming even more dependent upon the market for its survival. 
Policies place the global commodity market in the position of allocating goods and 
services, expanding the influence of the market ethos that contributes to social inequality. 
Auspices of the ‘free market’ sentence people to poverty by virtue of instituting policies 
that are oriented toward helping the free flow of capital.  
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VII. Conclusion  
 
  “The peasants’ lot is really bitter, the countryside is really poor, and agriculture is 
in crisis,” said Li Changping, a rural cadre from central China’s Hubei Province, in an 
open letter to Premier Zhu Rongji in early 2000. Li’s burning indignation at the plight of 
the peasantry was inspired by his dislike of market distortions. Li’s statement highlights 
that the rural crisis is not simply a problem of rural economics and agricultural 
production, but also a social crisis that calls for the reconstruction of social life. The 
marketization of the rural economy saw spectacular economic growth and intense social 
disruption. During the late Mao period, the communes provided minimal security for 
most of the rural population. In its commodification of rural labor, the de-collectivization 
of agriculture undermined the commune system’s measures for labor security.  
Several Chinese anthropologists have argued that we are presently witnessing the 
end of the peasantry in China. While village society is becoming more town-like, the 
income gap between rural and urban China has grown dramatically since the mid-1990s. 
Alternatively, even if we view the peasantry as a disappearing social class, we need to 
ask what they are becoming. Perhaps in many cases they are shifting from one form of 
excluded population – the peasantry – to another – an urban underemployed underclass or 
a surplus population of slum dwellers. Can global capitalism, in its neoliberal mode, 
benefit rural society or will slums – urban and rural – simply continue to grow as 
warehouses of the excluded? As female novelist Wang Anyi writes, “We are rushing 
towards bourgeois society with all the enthusiasm of a proletarian revolution.” 
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VIII. Personal Reflections on the ISP Project  
 
As the ruling party proceeded to rebuild its power, there was a basic change in the 
way it addressed society. In the late seventies and eighties, the regime’s legitimacy 
continued to be fueled by ideology, but this ideology was no longer the Maoist ideology 
of previous years, but, rather, an ideology that promised a reformed socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. After 1989, discourse experienced continuous metamorphoses 
with an ever-growing emphasis on Chinese characteristics, while its socialist contents 
became more and more nominal. The party’s legitimacy was henceforward fueled by the 
government’s ability satisfy the material demands of enough key groups to give it a basis 
of passive content in the population. To achieve this goal, the party turned to the market. 
 During my Independent Study, I attempted to the think through the pitfalls of the 
state’s adoption of the neoliberal doctrine, particularly the doctrine’s adverse effects on 
an ethnically Bai rural community. Disillusioned by the uneven expansion of the market, 
my ISP was a period of frustration, reorientation and active intervention. I grew very 
attached to my host family who adopted me as one of their own. I soon began to 
internalize their financial concerns as though they were my own. I remember one day at 
the market, my hosts were unable to sell any meat. As I stood in the middle of the road 
with them, begging people to buy the pork, I felt their growing fears over not being able 
to sell the meat and nostalgia at the loss of social safety net.  
My experiences in Sideng confirmed for me the political constitution of poverty. 
The organization of society to facilitate the flow of capital, as manifested through 
neoliberal policies, dismantles the government’s financial and institutional capacities to 
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engage in full scale public provisioning and as such deprives persons of services crucial 
to their survival. Human subsistence related services should be treated as basic human 
rights rather than commercial commodities. I realized the importance of questioning 
modernity, and to search for different methods of economic development that are not 
dependent upon social polarization and inequality. I want my ISP to provoke intellectual 
engagement in eliminating utopian marketization.  
My experience also illuminated for me the violence inherent in political structures 
involved in withholding and depriving persons of their survival. In a situation of severe 
inequality, the failure to rectify that inequality by the state is violent, especially when 
society has the ability and technology to do so.   
 
IX. Future ISP Topics 
 
 Migration and ethnicity  
 The processes that lead to the emergence of urban slums in Kunming 
 Contemporary efforts to eradicate the Sannongwenti  
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